In an era of increasing unpredictability and volatility, the concept of resilience has become central to security strategies worldwide. Poland’s 2020 National Security Strategy underscores this trend, prioritising the integration of national security mechanisms to enhance the state’s ability to absorb and adapt to crises, although it remains heavily state-centric and conservative in its approach.
In recent years, security strategies of states and international organisations have been increasingly emphasising the unpredictability and volatility of their environments. The catalogues of risks and threats included in security concepts range from traditional state-centred and military threats, through hybrid warfare and terrorism, to more dispersed risks such as pandemics and the negative effects of climate change. As the crises multiply, and become impossible to evade and difficult to manage effectively, the security discourse has been slowly infused with the concept of resilience. In the context of security studies, it can be defined as the development of capabilities which allow the shocks caused by crises to be absorbed, as well as to adapt, rebuild, and constantly strengthen the weakest links in order to increase the ability of the entire system to survive.
Yet the actual understanding of resilience and its expressions may vary, depending on the context and time. In one of the typologies, proposed by Philippe Bourbeau, resilience relies on three strategies. The first one is based on the idea that shocks and disturbances are a negative occurrence, so the dominant strategy of providing security should rely on maintenance of critical infrastructures and capabilities and bouncing back following a crisis. In this way, it is a rather conservative, based on resistance to change and quick restoration to status quo. The second strategy requires more flexibility and is based on the idea of adaptation of the system at the margins. In this way, crises are not viewed as purely negative, but as an opportunity to introduce slight adjustments (while preserving the core of the system) in order to be better suited to deal with the volatile environment. Finally, the third strategy relies on renewal of the system. In this perspective, the crisis is a grave occurrence which requires a full transformation of the system.
This diversity of strategies also implies a diversity of tools for increasing resilience, including civilian and military capabilities, and the different ways in which they can be prioritised and applied. This analysis focuses on the interpretation of and tools for resilience set out in the latest Security Strategy of Poland.
Resilience in the 2020 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland
The most recent iteration of the Polish National Security Strategy was published by the National Security Office in May 2020 in the midst of the pandemic. As the numbers of cases of COVID-19 were on the rise, new restrictions were being introduced, and as crisis management capabilities became increasingly strained the idea of resilience became particularly resonant. Indeed, from the start the Strategy emphasises the increasing complexity, uncertainty, and unpredictability of the contemporary security environment and the proliferation of risks and challenges to security. It notes their diverse character, spanning from the aggressive posture of Russia and its use of hybrid methods to destabilise states and alliances, through regional conflicts and increasing interstate competition, to health (in-)security, the development of new (disruptive) technologies, and climate change. Given this interpretation of the security environment, it is no surprise that the 2020 Security Strategy insists on integrating the dispersed mechanisms and elements of national security, allowing them to respond flexibly and quickly to emerging situations. It also states that “Actions are constantly being taken to increase the resilience of the state and its society to contemporary threats.”
The interpretation of resilience and its tools can be found primarily in three subchapters of the Strategy: “National security management,” “Resilience of the state and common civic defence,” and (to a lesser extent) “Polish Armed Forces.”
National security management
In the first of them, the document announces the development of an integrated management system of national security, aimed at merging the subsystems of national security, crisis response, and cybersecurity. This integrated system is intended to be coordinated by a supra-ministerial management mechanism, adjusted to NATO’s crisis response framework, and should enable “a smooth transition from the state of peace to the state of crisis and war.” The Strategy also assumes that “civil and defence planning” should include both state and local levels of administration. In doing so, the Strategy clearly reflects the premises of a whole-of-government approach to crisis response, linking the efforts of multiple ministries, governmental agencies, and administrative bodies in order to deal with a crisis situation. While this approach is more befitting to the logic of crisis management, it does not stand at odds with the assumptions of resilience. Yet it does seem rather limited. The Strategy focuses solely on governmental capabilities and existing mechanisms, failing to recognise the potential involvement of other, non-state actors, such as the civil society, NGOs or international organisations, or suggesting innovative or adaptive mechanisms of dealing with crises.
Resilience of the state and common civic defence
The next sub-chapter of the Strategy discusses the goal of “increasing the state's resilience by creating a system of common civic defence, based on the efforts of the entire nation and building an understanding for the development of the Republic of Poland’s resilience and defence capabilities.” Here, the Strategy assumes a much broader scope of participation, including not only central and local government, but also the education and higher education systems, local communities, businesses, non-governmental organisations and citizens, which are to contribute to a comprehensive state resilience to non-military and military threats. The Strategy also notes the necessity of gathering and maintaining the capacity to reproduce the necessary resources and create strategic reserves, the development of adaptive capabilities, protection of the critical infrastructure, and early identification of threats. It also indicates the need for the development of cooperation skills, networks of formal and non-formal social organizations and “shaping a community of values within Polish society”. Yet, interestingly, in accordance with NATO’s Baseline Requirements for national resilience, the Strategy prioritises the resilience of the continuity of government and functioning of the state, effective energy supplies, and response to the uncontrolled movement of people and population relocation, rather than community resilience. Also, even though the document refers to the need to adapt to changing needs and challenges, it relies, to a large extent, on already existing capabilities such as counterintelligence and inter-departmental cooperation.
Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland
In terms of the tools for resilience indicated in the Strategy, there seems to be a certain contradiction. While the document emphasises the need to establish an integrated system and development of resilience to military and non-military threats, it contains very little indication of civil-military coordination in terms of resilience building efforts. Instead, it suggests a certain level of subservience of the civilian domain to the armed forces. The subchapter on “Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland” contains multiple references to acquiring and using reserves of personnel, effectively reducing society at large to a recruitment pool. The Strategy also notes that “common civic defence readiness in the territory of the whole country” will be developed through and by the Territorial Defence Forces, thus essentially militarising civil defence and (to a lesser extent) preparedness.
Resistance and maintenance as the basis for Polish resilience
The interpretation of resilience proposed in the 2020 National Security Strategy of Poland is rather conservative and focused on the maintenance of the state and its critical capabilities. While it does refer to community resilience, the centre of attention remains the critical infrastructure and strategic reserves. The Strategy does include the non-state civilian actors in the resilience scheme, but they are subordinated to the state institutions and (to a certain extent) the military. Despite frequent references to adaptation, the document does not provide much room for flexibility and innovation, instead representing an understanding of resilience as resistance to shocks, the maintenance of critical capabilities, and the ability to bounce back after crises.
The purpose of this analysis was to trace the most recent conceptualisation of Polish resilience and its tools proposed in the National Security Strategy as the framework document underlying Polish approach to security. The assessment of its implementation and of the state of resilience in Poland would require an in-depth investigation of the state of Polish critical infrastructure (starting from energy, through health and food, down to cyber and transportation), strategic reserves, the existing linkages between state and non-state bodies and their effectiveness, as well as the level of preparedness of these institutions and the society at large. As such, it is beyond the scope of this text. However, the way resilience is interpreted at the strategic level has consequences in terms of the practical solutions applied in response to crises. In this case, the state-centred and militarised approach to resilience at the discursive level can also be seen in Polish crisis response, with the Armed Forces frequently mobilised to react in non-military crisis. The most visible example of that was the adoption of the resilience frame by the Territorial Defence Forces during the COVID-19 pandemic, with operation codenames such as “Resilient Spring” and “Permanent Resilience”.
While it is unlikely that Poland will significantly change its maintenance-oriented interpretation of resilience, it is possible that the civilian part of the resilience scheme will be strengthened in practice. In March 2024 the Polish government has proposed a bill on civil protection and civil defence which addresses some the current limitations of community resilience and proposes the establishment of a civil preparedness/defence corps. Such a civilian capability ready to respond in non-military crises would be a good contribution to the overall resilience scheme, however its overall capabilities and effectiveness are yet to be developed.
This publication was prepared as a part of the dissemination of findings from the Future Democracy Lab Flagship Project funded by the Jagiellonian University's Excellence Initiative.
