Once dismissed as “alarmist”, Poland and the Baltic States are now driving the West’s response to the long-term threat of a neo-revisionist Russia.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is not an isolated event based upon the imperialistic whims of Vladimir Putin and his regime. It is part of a wider neo-revisionist Russian threat towards the entire postwar process of Euro-Atlantic integration. This means that the European Union can expect a renewed period of Russo-European confrontation that will last for the foreseeable future. Poland and the Baltic States, once dismissed as being “alarmist” about Russia, are now leading the coordinated Western response to this new geopolitical reality.
Russia expands its hostile military posture towards NATO
Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, has started to make frequent public threats against the NATO and EU members Poland and the Baltic States. He provocatively referred to the Baltic States as “our” provinces and challenged Poland’s statehood by calling it “a dangerous enemy” of Russia.
Medvedev’s bellicose rhetoric comes amid Russia’s rapid rearmament in the Baltic Sea region. The Polish government last year confirmed that the Kremlin deployed an arsenal of short-range nuclear weapons to Belarus, which shares a 679 km-long border with Lithuania. High up in the Arctic Circle, Norway’s intelligence services issued a warning about the presence of tactical nuclear-armed vessels from the Russian Northern Fleet.
Russia’s renewed military aggression has fundamentally changed the geopolitical landscape of Europe. The accessions of Finland and Sweden to NATO mean that the space of the defensive military alliance now lies uninterrupted from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Sweden’s sovereign decision to renounce its long-standing neutrality reflects Russia’s growing isolation as a result of its unprovoked act of aggression against Ukraine. But this historic round of NATO enlargement comes not without risk to European security.
Russia still possesses ballistic missile capabilities in its enclave of Kaliningrad, which potentially limits NATO’s freedom of manoeuvre across the Baltic Sea and Polish territory. In a sign of its hard-power intent, the Kremlin has initiated planned structural and leadership changes in Kaliningrad and western Russia, according to Lithuanian intelligence. Russia’s intensified militarisation has prompted Finland’s prime minister, Petteri Orpo, to warn the EU that Moscow is preparing for a prolonged confrontation with the West.
Poland and the Baltics: a new power bloc in Europe
France and Germany, the two largest economies in the EU, have seen Russia as an essential European actor with legitimate security concerns. In 2022, the French president, Emmanuel Macron, stated in talks with his American counterpart, Joe Biden, that NATO’s proximity to Russia’s borders was one of the “essential points” that needed to be addressed. The ambiguous response of the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine suggests Berlin still holds onto the notion that European security cannot be achieved without the participation of Moscow.
However, as the threat of a resurgent Russia becomes clearer, the geostrategic centre of Europe is moving further eastwards. Poland and the Baltic States are leading a paradigm shift on how Russia should be confronted because of their shared historical experience of Russian expansionism.
Poland has a deep understanding that its security starts in the Baltic Sea as Polish foreign policy identifies the region as of “vital importance”. Since his return to office as Poland’s prime minister last December, Donald Tusk has stressed the need to deepen security cooperation with the Baltic States as Russia rearms: “Europe needs to realise that this new arms race started by Russia, as well as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, are a wake-up call for all European governments”, stated the Polish prime minister after holding talks with his Latvian counterpart, Evika Siliņa, in Warsaw in February.
Poland is certainly setting a leadership example for the rest of Europe when it comes to defence spending. Four percent of Poland’s GDP has been allocated to its armed forces - more than any other NATO ally. Such a high level of expenditure allows Poland to become an indispensable European security provider. Furthermore, the Polish and Danish governments have recently agreed to strengthen their military cooperation and urged the European defence industry to accelerate arms production.
The Baltic States see Poland as a strategically-powerful ally in their efforts to bolster their defences against Russia. Tusk’s swift and decisive action to restore the rule of law in Poland has enabled his country to rebuild its ties with the EU and play a constructive role in European foreign and security policy. Indeed, Polish influence can already be seen in the changing French and German approaches towards their respective national interests.
France and Germany: shifting perceptions of security
Macron has called on his EU partners to do more to ensure Ukraine’s victory, which he now believes to be vital for European security: “We need to be realistic about the situation that’s unfolding in Europe”, said the French president after meeting with his Czech opposite number, Petr Pavel, in Prague in March. Macron’s framing of Russia’s war against Ukraine as a European conflict reflects France’s shifting perception of Moscow as a threat to its security. At the European Council summit in March, France pushed forward a debate on joint debt as a method to boost EU defence financing at a time of intense strain on national budgets.
A similar process is taking place in Germany. Its foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, has shown remarkable leadership on the need to build trust with Poland, which has grown increasingly suspicious of Germany’s rapprochement with Russia since the end of the Cold War: "A strong Europe needs more than ever a lively German-Polish partnership”, stated Baerbock in a meeting with her Polish counterpart, Radosław Sikorski, in Berlin in January. In the first few months of the full-scale invasion, Berlin was reluctant to send heavy weapons to Kyiv. Today, Germany is Ukraine’s largest bilateral donor of military aid in Europe.
Conclusion
Russia has shown that it is prepared to use force to restore its status as a great power. If Vladimir Putin were to be successful in subjugating Ukraine, it is likely that his expansionist ambitions would be emboldened to test the credibility of NATO’s Article 5 collective security guarantee. In this rapidly evolving European security situation, it is Poland and the Baltic States, along with the Czech Republic, that are driving the West’s response.
Hugo Blewett-Mundy is a commentator and consultant specialising in Central and Eastern Europe. His articles have appeared in EUobserver, the Center for European Policy Analysis, and Ukrainska Pravda. Hugo is also a Non-Resident Associate Research Fellow from EUROPEUM in Prague. He holds an MA in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics from the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies in London.