As Russia's invasion of Ukraine unfolded, triggering a massive exodus of people seeking refuge, Poland found itself thrust into a pivotal role as a frontline state and a primary destination for war refugees. Now, as well as facing a decrease in resources, Poland has to consider multilateral approaches to assistance but also address the challenge of growing anti-Ukrainian sentiment within its society.
Immediately after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was launched, a proportion of the Ukrainian population began to flee into neighbouring states, turning them into frontline states. Poland, which shares a 535-kilometre border with Ukraine and was already home to over 1.5 million Ukrainians, became the main crossing point and destination for many of those on the move. The Polish state, despite having no prior experience of managing a large inflow of migrants – be it infrastructural or administrative – opened its borders and offered support to Ukrainians fleeing the war.
National support as a result of security concerns
The positive reaction of the Polish state toward migrants from Ukraine was not unfounded; however, it remains to be seen whether it can be maintained in the long term. At the Polish state level, the unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine is seen as a security threat. This has been the official Polish position since the 2014 annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, as well as the start of the war in Donbas. Since then, recognising Russia as an aggressor state and understanding its own position as a frontline state, the Polish Government has opted for strengthening the country’s defence capacity, and focusing on deterrence and stronger alliances with both NATO and the United States.
Positive social attitudes towards Ukrainians
At the social level, the Polish attitude towards Ukrainians was initially that of ‘neighbours in need’; politically, it can be argued that this gave the largest impetus for the Polish state structure to absorb a large number of refugees. However, this Polish perception of Ukrainian migrants was nothing new; it was already evidenced in public opinion research from 2020 conducted by the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe and the Foreign Policy Council’s ‘Ukrainian Prism’ – financially supported by the Kyiv and Warsaw offices of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The survey results showed a generally positive mutual perception of both societies towards one another. Both groups of respondents perceived the other side as ‘neighbours’; however, Ukrainians also used such terms as ‘friends’ or ‘brothers’ for their Polish neighbours more than was the case vice versa.
Importantly, from the perspective of current developments in the region and Poland’s readiness to assist Ukraine and Ukrainians – especially in the first months of the full-scale invasion – the findings of the 2020 evidence point to Ukrainian economic migration in Poland as the main factor explaining positive relations between Ukrainians and Poles. Specifically for Ukrainians, Poland was the country to which they would prefer to go in search of employment and improved living conditions; for Poles, Ukraine was a country affected by an economic crisis, which thus explained the migration of its people to Poland. Interactions between Poles and Ukrainians thus took place mainly within Poland, particularly in the workplace. This, the research concluded, created a certain asymmetry in relations, where Ukrainians know more about Poland, Poles, and the Polish language than Poles do about Ukrainian society, and yet are in a lower social and economic position due to their migrant status. This asymmetry was identified as a potential risk for the future if not addressed adequately by the Polish state and society. Most importantly for the analysis of the current situation and the new wave of migrants from Ukraine, the research revealed that the positive view among Polish respondents towards Ukrainians was based on the belief that their migration to Poland was caused by a harsh economic situation and is therefore temporary.
The results of this research were almost immediately verified in the spring of 2022, when many Ukrainian refugees arrived in Poland seeking safety and adequate conditions in which to settle, even temporarily. It also explains why a large number of Ukrainians decided to stay in Poland. Depending on many factors, including the situation in Ukraine, some will possibly opt to live in Poland for a longer period. The results of the 2020 research also explain the rare occurrences of negative reactions against the Ukrainian migrants that took place during the first phase of the war. But they also explain the increase in negative attitudes as time went on.
The so-called fatigue with a large number of refugees emerged around six months into the full-scale war and increased significantly about a year later when the Polish public started receiving information about the lack of success with the much hoped-for Ukrainian counteroffensive. At that moment, it became widely recognised that the military aggression may continue in Ukraine for a longer period of time and, as a result, that many refugees would not be able to return home. Hence, their sojourn in Poland ceased to be seen as temporary.
Negative attitudes towards Ukrainians and a decrease in support for refugees
In the period since February 2022, the situation has also changed in Poland. Like many other European states, the country has been negatively affected by the rise of energy prices and resulting inflation. Many indicators suggest that Polish resources for Ukrainian migrants have significantly decreased and that the level of assistance offered has therefore been reduced. Although undeclared, the policy of the state is that Ukrainian migrants in Poland should become financially independent and based on the assumption that they can provide for themselves. This policy is most likely a reflection of the social mood revealed in opinion polls, which were conducted in the second half of 2022. Surveys conducted in 2023 confirmed the trend, which also explains why such relevant political issues as Poland’s support for Ukraine and Ukrainians living in Poland were not adequately addressed during the parliamentary election campaign; they were either silenced by mainstream political forces, regardless of where they were on the political spectrum, or rhetorically manipulated by politicians representing radical views, primarily on the right.
In parallel, as reported by the Warsaw Office of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (HFH), anti-Ukrainian rhetoric – often labelled as #StopUkrainizacjiPolski – began to be widely present and continued growing, especially online. Anti-Ukrainian and anti-refugee statements have most often been seen on Twitter (now X), but they have also been recorded on other social media platforms (Facebook and YouTube) as well as used verbally in public. Based on semantic analysis, the term "Ukrainization" – as stated by the authors of the HFHR report – can be understood as ”an economic domination, an advantage in access to social benefits, or even ‘invasion’ in the symbolic dimension”. An increase in such grievances – translating into anti-Ukrainian, anti-refugee sentiment including cases of physically violent acts – has also been reported by other watchdog institutions, including the Association of Ukrainians in Poland, which regularly monitors the spread of hate speech in Poland against Ukrainians.
The above context also explains the different positions of the two most recent Polish governments (the Law and Justice administration until December 2023 and that of the Civic Coalition since December 2023) toward protests organised at the Polish-Ukrainian border against Ukrainian transports of goods to EU markets, made possible by the liberalization of international transportation between Ukraine and the EU countries as decided by the European Commission. In reaction to the claims of the protesters demanding a ban on Ukrainian transports through Poland, that of Law and Justice was of inertia, while that of the Civic Coalition was to approve of the protesters’ claims. While the blockages of the border by Polish transport workers and farmers may not appear to be related to the issue of Polish society’s attitudes towards the refugees, it points to the existing acceptance by the society of activities that are regarded as hurtful to Ukraine’s economy and security, at a time when it is at war with the Russian Federation. The protests and their handling (or lack thereof) by the Polish authorities are negatively interpreted by Ukrainian politicians and opinion-makers, which has generated additional tensions in Polish-Ukrainian relations.
The future of Polish assistance
Given the 2020 survey results and the current situation in Poland – i.e. the number of Ukrainian migrants that has reached roughly three million people, and the economic slowdown that has coincided with increasing cases of anti-Ukrainian behaviour and speech, affecting the social mood – we can expect less willingness on the part of the Polish society to help the newcomers. In this light, it is recommended that the Polish state, which may no longer have sufficient resources to adequately address the needs of the Ukrainian migrants, starts cooperating with external partners, for example, the European Union. Moving assistance on to a more multilateral platform would not only ensure its continuation, which is the most important factor from the perspective of those who are fleeing from the war but could also reduce the potential growth of anti-migrant sentiment in Poland.
This analysis is a shortened and updated version of an article published as a part of a policy research paper edited by Agata Mazurkiewicz and Wojciech Michnik, available online here.
Dr. Iwona Reichardt is Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the journal New Eastern Europe. She teaches courses on Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova at the Jagiellonian University of Kraków. Reichardt is co-editor of: Three Ukrainian Revolutions: Mobilisation and Change in Contemporary Ukraine, 3 vols. (ibidem 2019-22).